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BANKRUPTCY LAW-AvOIDANCE OF DIVORCE LIENS UNDER 
SECTION 522(f)(1) OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE: ALL'S FAIR IN 
LOVE AND DIVORCE 
INTRODUCTION 
Section 522(b) of the Bankruptcy Code t ("Code") allows a debtor 
to exempt certain property, real and personal, from the debtor's bank­
ruptcy estate.2 The Code provides these exemptions in order to pro­
tect the debtor from his or her creditors and to provide a "fresh start" 
for the debtor with at least the "basic necessities of life."3 Section 
522(f)(I) of the Code allows a debtor to avoid judicial liens that are 
viewed as impairing these exemptions. To avoid a lien under this sec­
tion, a debtor must satisfy three requirements: (1) the lien must be a 
judicial lien; (2) the lien must impair an exemption to which the 
debtor is entitled; and (3) the debtor must possess the property inter­
est to which the lien fixed, prior to the fixing of the lien on that prop­
1. The Bankruptcy Code is the name commonly used when referring to The Bank­
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at 11 
U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988». 
2. 11 u.s.c. § 522(b) (1988) provides in relevant part: 

an individual debtor may exempt from property of the estate the property listed in 

either paragraph (1) or, in the alternative, paragraph (2) of this subsection .... 

Such property is-­
(1) property that is specified under subsection (d) of this section ...; or, in 
the alternative, 
(2)(A) any property that is exempt under Federal law, other than subsection 
(d) of this section, or State or loca1law that is applicable on the date of the 
filing of the petition . . .. 
Id. 
II U.S.C. § 522(d) (1988) states: 

The following property may be exempted under subsection (b)(I) of this section: 

(1) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed $7,500 in value, in real 
property . . . that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor uses as a 
residence .... 
Id. 
11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1988) provides: 
(a) The commencement of a case under ... this title creates an estate. Such 
estate is comprised of ... all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property 
as of the commencement of the case. 
Id. 
3. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 126 (1978), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6087. See infra notes 24-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
bankruptcy law's "fresh start" policy. 
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erty interest.4 
One type of lien that has been the recent focus of decisions involv­
ing section 522(f)(I) is the "divorce lien."s The divorce lien, which is 
generally created during the division of the marital assets in a divorce 
proceeding, is commonly utilized in divorce law to secure an equitable 
distribution of the marital property.6 For example, one spouse may be 
granted a lien on the marital home, while title to the home is granted 
to the other spouse. When the spouse with title to the home enters 
into bankruptcy, claims a homestead exemption, and then attempts to 
avoid his or her former spouse's lien on the marital property by claim­
ing that the lien impairs that exemption, a conflict arises between 
bankruptcy law's "fresh start" policy and divorce law's doctrine .of 
equitable distribution.7 
After the passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19788 and 
prior to the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Farrey v. 
Sanderfoot,9 four federal courts of appeals, as well as many bank­
ruptcy and district courts, considered the ability of a debtor spouse to 
avoid a divorce lien under section 522(f)(I) of the Code. These courts 
reached different results.lO Some courts decided that the divorce lien 
could not be avoided as the lien did not attach to the debtor spouse's 
interest in the property (as required by section 522(f)(I», but rather 
attached to the creditor spouse's pre-existing interest in the property. I I 
Other courts allowed the debtor spouse to avoid the lien on the theory 
4. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) (1988) states: 
Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid the fixing of a 
lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs an 
exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of 
this section, if such lien is- . 
(1) a judicial lien .... 
Id. 
5. A "divorce lien" is a lien against the marital home held by the ex-spouse not in 
possession of the home. See infra text accompanying notes 69-71. However, not all di­
vorce liens are judicial liens. See infra notes 231-39 and accompanying text. 
6. See Peter H. Arkison, The Death of the "Divorce Lien?", NORTON BANKR. L. 
ADVISER, Aug. 1988, at 6. 
7. See infra notes 63-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of equitable 
distribution. 
8. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 
(1988». 
9. 111 S. Ct. 1825 (1991). See infra Section II.B. for a discussion of Farrey v. 
Sanderfoat. 
10. See cases cited infra notes 78-79. 
11. Boyd v. Robinson, 741 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1984); In re Rittenhouse, 103 B.R. 
250 (D. Kan. 1989); Zachary v. Zachary (In re Zachary), 99 B.R. 916 (S.D. Ind. 1989); In 
re Alvarado, 92 B.R. 923 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1988). 
A pre-existing interest in this context is an interest that existed prior to the divorce, 
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that the divorce decree extinguished any pre-existing interest the cred­
itor spouse may have had and gave sole interest in the marital property 
to the debtor spouse. Consequently, the lien could only have attached 
to the debtor's interest and, thus, could be avoided under section 
522(f)(1).12 
The Supreme Court in Farrey determined that the divorce lien 
held by the ex-wife could not be avoided. 13 The Court held that the 
debtor (Sanderfoot) did not meet the third requirement of section 
522(f)(1) in that Sanderfoot did not possess the specific interest to 
which the lien fixed, before the lien fixed. 14 In Farrey, the divorce 
decree granted to the husband (Sanderfoot) sole ownership of the mar­
ital home, which had been held by Sanderfoot and his wife (Farrey) as 
joint tenants during their marriage. IS Farrey was awarded a lien on 
the house to secure her share of the marital assets.16 The Court found 
that under Wisconsin law the Sanderfoot-Farrey divorce decree extin­
guished both Sanderfoot's and Farrey's pre-existing interests in the 
marital property and created new ones. 17 Sanderfoot acquired his new 
interest in the property (a fee simple) with Farrey's lien already at­
tached. 18 Since he never possessed the fee simple interest to which 
Farrey's lien attached, before the lien attached, he could not avoid it. 
Although the Supreme Court's decision in Farrey clarifies the ap­
plication of section 522(f)(1) to divorce liens, to a certain extent, the 
opportunity for a debtor spouse to employ section 522(f)(I) as a stra­
tegic tool to wipe out his or her debt to the former spouse still remains. 
The Supreme Court's decision turned on when the lien was "fixed" 
and on the form of ownership in which the couple had held the prop­
erty prior to their divorce. Instead of producing a bright line rule that 
would end the manipulation of the Code by crafty debtor spouses, the 
Supreme Court's decision left the answer to the question of avoidance 
dependent upon several variables. These variables include the form of 
ownership in which the spouses had held the property prior to divorce, 
that is, an interest (either legal or equitable) in the marital property that belonged to a 
spouse while the marriage existed. 
12. Farrey v. Sanderfoot (In re Sanderfoot), 899 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'd, III 
S. Ct. 1825 (1991); Stedman v. Pederson (In re Pederson), 875 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1989); 
Maus v. Maus, 837 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1988); Duncan v. Sczepanski (In re Duncan), 85 
B.R. 80 (W.D. Wis. 1988). 
13. Farrey, III S. Ct. at 1830-31. 
14. Id. See a/so text of II U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) supra note 4. 
15. Farrey, III S. Ct. at 1827. 
16. [d. 
17. Id. at 1830. 
18. [d. 
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how the applicable state law views marital property at the time of di­
vorce, and a court's interpretation of when the lien "fixed." Congress 
should amend section 522(f)(1) of the Code to except from avoidance 
under it, liens on the marital home that are granted to a former spouse 
in a divorce proceeding to secure an equitable distribution of the mari­
tal property. Otherwise, a divorcing spouse who accepts such a lien as 
security for a later division of the marital property, will still be left 
vulnerable to losing his or her share of the marital property under 
section 522(f)(1) if the debtor spouse enters bankruptcy. The debtor 
spouse in this situation is unjustly enriched by his or her share of the 
acquisition of the former spouse's share of the dissolved marriage 
while the former spouse must struggle to achieve his or her new start 
after the lien is avoided. 
Section I of this Note describes the general history and purpose of 
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,19 with a specific focus on the 
statutory language, purpose, and legislative history of section 522(f). 
Section I also briefly describes the purpose and practices of divorce 
law in the division and settlement of the marital property. Section II 
reviews the conflicting interpretations as to whether section 522(f)(I) 
empowers the possessory debtor spouse to avoid a lien given to the 
nonpossessory creditor spouse in a divorce settlement. This Section 
first focuses on the conflicting rationales of the Courts of Appeals for 
the Eighth and the Seventh Circuits in the cases of Boyd v. Robinson 20 
and In re Sanderfoot,21 respectively. Section II then discusses the de­
cision of the Supreme Court in Farrey v. Sanderfoot.22 Section III 
demonstrates the impact of the Farrey decision on future divorce liens 
by applying the Farrey analysis to the four federal courts of appeals' 
cases that were decided prior to Farrey. This Section separates the 
cases into two categories: marital property held in joint tenancy and 
marital property held in only one spouse's name. This Section demon­
strates the problem areas left open by the Farrey decision. Finally, 
Section IV proposes a solution to the conflict and confusion. Section 
522(f)(1) should be amended so that liens on the marital home that 
are granted to a former spouse in a divorce proceeding to secure an 
equitable distribution of the marital property cannot be avoided in 
bankruptcy. 
19. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 
(1988)). 
20. 741 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1984); see infra notes 86-113 and accompanying text. 
21. 899 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1825 (1991); see infra notes 114­
39 and accompanying text. 
22. 111 S. Ct. 1825 (1991). 
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I. BACKGROUND 

In the area of divorce liens, bankruptcy law and divorce law pres­
ently conflict. A general look at these two areas of law better illus­
trates this conflict. This Section first discusses the general history and 
purpose of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,23 specifically focusing 
on the purpose and legislative history of section 522(f)(1). Then it 
discusses how the division and settlement of marital property is gener­
ally achieved in divorce, specifically focusing on the doctrine of equita­
ble distribution and the use of divorce liens to achieve such a 
distribution. 
A. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and Section 522(f) 
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 197824 replaced the National 
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (" 1898 Act").25 The 1898 Act,26 which had 
been frequently amended and modified over the years, "became much 
too inflexible and antiquated to deal with consumer and business fi­
nancial failures in modern society."27 As a result, a comprehensive 
modernization of the nation's bankruptcy laws was undertaken.28 Af­
ter several years of study and numerous congressional hearings and 
debates, Congress passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,29 
which became effective October 1, 1979. The purpose of the Act was 
23. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 
(1988». 
24. Id. 
25. Pub. L. No. 55-171, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (repealed 1978). 
26. Id. 
27. 1 ALAN N. REsNICK & EUGENE M. WYPYSKI, BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 
1978: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY Preface (1979). 
28. See Stewart E. Bland, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of1978: An Overview, 44 Ky. 
BENCH & B. 8 (1980). 
In 1970, Congress created the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United 
States to study the current bankruptcy laws and to recommend changes for modernizing 
the current bankruptcy law system. Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468. 
In 1973, in its report, the commission found that the old bankruptcy system produced 
substantial administrative costs, inefficiencies, and delays; inadequacy of relief for both 
debtors and creditors; and a lack of uniformity in the practices of the courts and the treat­
ment of debtors and creditors. H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 3-4 
(1973). 
29. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as aniended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 
(1988». Overall, the Code has simplified and streamlined the bankruptcy system. Specifi­
cally in the area of exemptions, the debtor was given increased exemptions, as well as other 
protections from creditors, and the classes of creditors and their rights were more clearly 
defined. Bland, supra note 28, at 8. 
The report of the House Judiciary Committee stated: "This bill is not primarily a 
debtor's bill, however. The bill codifies creditors' rights more clearly than the case law, 
which is in many ways just developing. It defines protections to which a secured creditor is 
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to create an efficient bankruptcy system where the primary focus was 
to provide the debtor with a "fresh start, free from creditor harass­
ment and free from the worries and pressures of too much debt."30 
When a petition for bankruptcy is filed under Chapter 7,31 either 
by the debtor (a voluntary bankruptcy) or by the creditors of the 
debtor (an involuntary bankruptcy), an estate of the debtor is cre­
ated.32 This estate is comprised of all of the debtor's legal and equita­
ble interest in his or her property, wherever located, as of the 
commencement of the case. 33 The estate is then liquidated and the 
proceeds distributed among the debtor's creditors.34 However, a 
debtor is permitted to exempt certain property from the estate.35 This 
exempted property is not made available t() creditors for any unpaid 
debt that remains after the estate has been fully administered. Instead, 
this property remains with the debtor, thereby providing the debtor 
with a basis for a fresh start.36 
Under the 1898 Act, as amended, the debtor had to declare his or 
her exemptions according to the law of the state in which he or she 
resided, as there was no uniform federal exemption policy.37 This led 
to a "denial or loss of exemptions [to debtors] as a result of inequitable 
provisions of state law" regarding exemptions and waivers.38 In addi­
tion, most states had not raised the dollar level of their exemptions 
since their creation, which, in practice, attenuated the ameliorative ef­
fect of exemptions.39 The Code provides a federal list of exemptions.4O 
entitled, and the means through which the court may grant that protection." H.R. REp. 
No. 595, supra note 3, at 4-5, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5966. 
30. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 3, at 125, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
6086. 
31. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1988). Chapter 7 of the Code provides relief to debtors 
through liquidation. LAWRENCE P. KING & MICHAEL L. CooK, CREDITORS' RIGHTS, 
DEBTORS' PROTECTION AND BANKRUPTCY § 1O.03[A], at 608 (2d ed. 1989). 
32. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1988). 
33. Id. 
34. H.R. Doc. No. 137, supra note 28, pt. I, at 3. 
35. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b), (d) (1988). 
Some kinds of property that may be exempted (limited by dollar amounts) include real 
property, a motor vehicle, household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appli­
ances, books, animals, crops, musical instruments, jewelry, professional books or tools, as 
well as some intangible property rights, such as the right to receive a social security or a 
veterans' benefit. See generally id. at § 522(d). 
36. William S. Parkinson, The Lien Avoidance Section o/the Bankruptcy Code: Can 
It Be Avoided By State Exemption Statutes?, 11 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 319,320 (1984). 
37. H.R. Doc. No. 137, supra note 28, pt. I, at 171. 
38. H.R. Doc. No. 137, supra note 28, pt. I, at 169. In a waiver of exemption clause, 
a debtor agrees to relinquish his right to exempt property that is subject to a lien. Parkin­
son, supra note 36, at 324. 
39. Most state exemption laws were "outmoded, [having been] designed for more 
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In addition, the congressional committee and conference reports 
noted that unsecured consumer and commercial creditors, sensing a 
debtor's imminent bankruptcy, often rushed into court to obtain liens. 
on exempt property prior to the debtor's entry into bankruptcy.41 Be­
cause the 1898 Act did not provide "certain rights ... with respect to 
exempt property," one of which was the right to "void any judicial 
lien on exempt propertY,"42 a debtor usually could not avoid these 
liens and creditors were able to defeat the debtor's exemptions.43 This 
frustrated the purpose of exemptions, which is to provide the debtor 
with the "basic necessities of life" so as to prevent the debtor from 
rural times, and hopelessly inadequate to ... provide a fresh start for modem urban debt­
ors." H.R. REp. No. 595, supra note 3, at 126, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6087. 
40. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (1988). See generally 7 CoLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (15th ed. 
1991). 
The commission recommended that there be a federal list of exemptions and that the 
then current state and federal laws governing exemptions be superseded. H.R. Doc. No. 
137, supra note 28, pt. I, at 170. After changes by both the House and the Senate, the 
provision ultimately adopted in the Code allows the debtor to choose between the federal 
exemptions or state exemptions. Parkinson, supra note 36, at 323. However, the state has 
the right to "opt-out" of the federal list in § 522(d). 11 U.S.C. § 522(b), (d) (1988). Pres­
ently, a majority of states have "opted-out." Robert H. Bowmar, Avoidance Of Judicial 
Liens That Impair Exemptions In Bankruptcy; The Workings Of11 u.s.c. § 522(f)(1), 63 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 375, 383 (1989). A state that "opts-out" of the federal list of exemptions 
is not held to have "opted-out" of § 522(0 (lien avoidance). Id. at 385. 
The federal homestead exemption in § 522(d) for the debtor's aggregate interest in real 
property is 57500. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d). The state exemptions vary extensively. See. e.g., 
ARK. CoDE ANN. § 16-66-218 (Michie 1987) (allowing a debtor to exempt 5800 for un­
married debtors or 51250 for married debtors in a residence); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 188, § 1 
(1990) (allowing a debtor to exempt 5100,000 in principal family residence). 
Furthermore, in some of these states the exemption statutes limit the circumstances 
under which a debtor can claim a homestead exemption. See generally Holtzhauser v. 
Holtzhauser (In re Holtzhauser), 117 B.R. 519 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1990) (stating that the 
homestead exemption in NEB. REv. STAT. § 40-101 (1988) only applies to general judg­
ment liens arising under NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1301 (1985) and not judgment liens arising 
from divorce proceedings under NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-371 (1988»; In re Stone, 119 B.R. 
222 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1990) (stating that the specific language of Washington's home­
stead exemption limits what liens actually impair the homestead exemption). 
41. H.R. REp. No. 595, supra note 3, at 126, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
6087. An "unsecured creditor" is generally one who has no security interest such as a 
mortgage, a lien, or some sort of coIlateral, in the property of the debtor. KING & COOK, 
supra note 31, § 1.07, at 5 (2d ed. 1989). 
42. H.R. REp. No. 595, supra note 3, at 126, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
6087. 
A "lien" is an interest in property to secure payment of a debt. See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 101(33) (1988). By obtaining a lien on the property, the creditor can proceed against that 
property to enforce the claim. KING & CooK, supra note 31, § 3.07, at 120. When a lien is 
avoided, the creditor no longer has a right to enforce the underlying debt against the prop­
erty that was subject to the lien. 
43. Parkinson, supra note 36, at 324. 
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being left "destitute and a public charge."44 
Section 522 of the Code was enacted to rectify these deficien­
cies.45 Section 522 details what exemptions are available to the debtor 

. and how the debtor can make use of these exemptions in bankruptcy. 

The various subsections of section 522 deal with basic definitions,46 

what property may be exempted,47 amounts of exemptions,48 liability 
during and after the bankruptcy proceeding,49 waiver of exemptions, 50 
and several other aspects of exemptions not pertinent to this 
discussion.51 
Section 522(f) addresses the avoidance of liens on certain quali­
fied exempt property to which a debtor has claimed an exemption, 
specifically addressing avoidance of judicial liens in section 
522(f)(1).52 Section 522(f) passed through Congress without modifi­
cation or debate, leaving little indication as to the intention of Con­
gress in enacting it. 53 However, the commission and committee 
reports contain a substantial amount of material regarding the purpose 
of section 522(f)(I).54 According to these reports, section 522(f)(1) 
allows a debtor to avoid certain types of liens encumbering specific 
qualified exempt property so that he or she may have a basis for reha­
bilitation.55 The ability to avoid judicial liens on exempt property per­
mits "the debtor to undo the actions of creditors that bring legal 
action against the debtor shortly before bankruptcy."56 Thus, even if a 
44. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 3, at 126, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
6087. 
45. Id. at 6087-88. 
46. 11 U.S.C. § 522(a) (1988). 
47. Id. § 522(b), (d) (allowing exemptions on certain real and personal property of 
the debtor). 
48. Id. § 522(d) (allowing maximum of $7500 on real property). 
49. Id. § 522(c) (indicating exempt property not liable for pre-petition claims except 
tax and alimony or support claims excepted from discharge, and unavoided liens). 
50. Id. § 522(e) (indicating waivers of exemptions unenforceable). 
51. Id. § 522(g)-(m). 
52. See supra note 4 for text of II U.S.C. § 522(f)(1). 
53. Parkinson, supra note 36, at 324. 
54. Id. 
55. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 3, at 125-27, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
6086-88. 
56. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 3, at 126, reprinted in 1978 u.S.C.C.A.N. at 
6087. The provision also was enacted to counter the superior bargaining position of credi­
tors who obtained blanket mortgages and waivers of exemptions from debtors. Id. A 
debtor who signed a blanket mortgage (a mortgage that covers more than one asset to 
secure the given debt) or a waiver of exemptions has allowed the creditor to repossess 
much, if not all, of the debtor's household goods if the debtor encounters trouble paying the 
creditor. Id. at 6088. The Code addresses this problem by allowing the debtor to invali­
date nonpossessory, nonpurchase money security interests, such as blanket mortgages, 
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creditor beats a debtor into court, the debtor is still entitled to his or 
her exemptions and a fresh start. 
When the lien is created through divorce, rather than a commer­
cial transaction, avoiding it raises additional policy concerns.57 A 
nonpossessory spouse (creditor) who has relied on a divorce lien to 
secure his or her interest in the marital property against a spouse 
granted title to the home who later becomes insolvent, is not like a 
commercial creditor "beating" the debtor into court. Allowing a 
debtor spouse to avoid a divorce lien does not appear to address Con­
gress' concerns, unless the divorce lien has been used by the nonpos­
sessory spouse as an attempt to "lock up" the assets of the other 
spouse just prior to bankruptcy. Only in this, comparatively rare, cir­
cumstance are the congressional concerns underlying section 522(f)(1) 
implicated in divorce liens. 
B. Divorce Law and the Use ofDivorce Liens 
As bankruptcy law has had to evolve in light of modem financial 
transactions,58 divorce law has also evolved in response to modem so­
cietal, cultural, and political changes. 59 Before the 1970's, in most of 
the United States the marital home was held in one spouse's name. 
When a couple divorced, the marital home was automatically granted 
through the lien avoidance provision. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2) (1988). Section 522(fX2) 
states, in part; 
[A] debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property 
to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have 
been entitled under subsection (b) of this section, if such lien is- ... 
(2) a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in any­
(A) household furnishings, household goods, ... that are held primarily 
for the personal, family, or household use of the debtor .... 
Id. 
This negates any unfair advantage over-reaching creditors may have used. H.R. Doc. 
No. 137, supra note 28, pt. I, at 127. The Code also made waivers of exemptions invalid, so 
that a debtor could not be forced to sign a waiver by a creditor in a superior bargaining 
position. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 76 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5787, 5862. 
57. Even in the commercial transaction more than just economic interests are in­
volved. As one commentator has expressed, "[m]ore realistically and profoundly, ec0­
nomic conflicts between participants of financial distress are occasions for the expression of 
their more fundamental moral, political, personal, and social values." Donald R. 
Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence ofBankruptcy, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 
764 -65 (1991). This article presents a value-based account of bankruptcy law, as an alter­
native to the economic account, in the context of corporate bankruptcy. 
58. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. 
59. LAWRENCE I. GOLDEN, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 1.01, at 2 
(1983). 
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to the "owner" spouse solely on the basis of title;60 the other spouse 
might be awarded alimony or maintenance in an attempt to offset the 
grant of the home to the spouse with title.61 Today, marriage is 
viewed as a partnership with both spouses contributing to the well­
being and success of the singular marital unit.62 When the marriage 
fails, courts now divide the marital property under the doctrine of eq­
uitable distribution.63 
Under this doctrine, the property of the marriage is allocated 
upon an equitable, although not necessarily equal, basis.64 The alloca­
tion is based upon several factors, including but not limited to the con­
tributions of each spouse "whether directly by employment or 
indirectly by providing homemaker services,"6S upon each spouse's 
conduct during the marriage, and their anticipated needs at and after 
divorce.66 The purpose of equitable distribution is to treat both parties 
fairly and provide each with a basis for making a new beginning in 
their newly separate lives. 
Although equitable distribution is now a national policy, the ap­
plicable statutes for carrying out the doctrine vary quite dramatically 
from one state to another.67 There is neither uniform state law nor 
60. Id. Under the traditional common law approach, all rights to marital property 
arise solely from the title to the property and not through any tangible or non-tangible 
contributions to the property by the non-titled spouse during the marriage. This means 
that where one spouse has title to the property but the other does not, the titled spouse 
would get the property in a divorce proceeding no matter what contributions were made by 
the non-titled spouse. The non-titled spouse's only recourse was a discretionary award of 
alimony, support or maintenance. See id. at 4-5. 
61. See id. at 2, 5. 
62. GoLDEN, supra note 59, at 1-2 (citing In re Marriage of Komnick, 417 N.E.2d 
1305 (Ill. 1981); Rothman v. Rothman, 320 A.2d 496 (N.J. 1974»; see also Jana B. Singer, 
Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REv. 1103, 1114 (1989). 
63. GoLDEN, supra note 59, at 1-3. 
Currently, all non-community property states have adopted some form of equitable 
distribution, either through statute or by judicial decision. Equitable Distribution Adopted 
by West Virginia's High Court, 9 FAM. L. REp. (BNA) 1133 (June 28, 1983). See generally 
Doris J. Freed & Timothy B. Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 21 
FAM. L.Q. 417, 452-62 (1988). 
A community property state views property acquired during the marriage as joint or 
marital property, with a few exceptions that certain property (the primary home not in­
cluded) be considered separate property. Title alone does not determine ownership. 
GOLDEN, supra note 59, at 6. 
64. GoLDEN, supra note 59, § 8.05, at 240-42. 
65. Id. § 1.01, at 2. 
66. Id. § 8.20, at 268. 
67. Id. § 1.01, at 2-3. 
The equitable distribution statutes detailing how a division is made vary greatly from 
state to state. These statutes range from those which are quite complex and detailed, pro­
viding lists of factors for consideration in making the final award, to those which are simple 
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federal law in the area of marriage and divorce.68 Nevertheless, one 
very common method of implementing an equitable distribution is the 
use of the "divorce lien."69 A court creating a divorce lien grants one 
spouse the marital home and grants the other spouse a lien against the 
home in the amount of his or her share of the marital property to 
secure later payment of that share. A divorce lien is often chosen, 
either by the parties or the courts, in order to avoid a forced sale of the 
home at the time of divorce while assuring the creditor spouse an 
eventual interest in the marital assets.70 Often the lien-holding spouse 
must wait until a specified number of years have passed, a specified 
event has occurred, or the property is sold to enforce the lien.7l 
A conflict between bankruptcy law's "fresh start" policy and di­
vorce law's doctrine of equitable distribution occurs when the spouse 
who was granted the marital home enters bankruptcy and attempts to 
avoid his or her former spouse's lien on the home under section 
522(f)(1). Different interpretations of section 522(f)(1) by the lower 
courts have exacerbated this conflict and caused much confusion. Re­
cently, the Supreme Court attempted to resolve the conflict and clarify 
the situation. 
II. CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION 522(f)(I) 

AMONG THE LoWER COURTS AND THE SUPREME 

COURT REsPONSE 

The lack of consensus among the courts in interpreting the statu­
tory language of section 522(f)(1) reflects the difficulties presented by 
the divorce lien issue. Although the literal reading of the statutory 
words seems to require avoidance of the lien, this produces not only an 
unjust result, but apparently was not what Congress intended.72 
and straightforward, merely stating that the court should make an equitable distribution of 
the marital property. Id. at 2. 
68. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA), which is a recommendation 
for uniform state laws in this area, has been adopted in some form by only a few states. See 
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CoMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK OF 
THE NATIONAL CoNFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PRO­
CEEDINGS 1986 (1990); see also Jane Rutheford, Duty In Divorce: Shared Income As A 
Path To Equality, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 539, 547-48 n.46 (1990). 
The UMDA requires an equitable distribution of marital property and supports the 
use ofa lien to accomplish that end. Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 307, 9A U.L.A. 
238-39 (1987). 
69. Arkison, supra note 6, at 6. 
70. A forced sale is not looked on favorably primarily because a forced sale generally 
brings a price for the home at lower than fair market value. 
71. Arkison, supra note 6, at 6. 
72. See supra notes 54 -56 for a discussion of Congress' intent in passing § 522(f)(1). 
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Under section 522(f)(I), a debtor must satisfy three requirements in 
order to avoid a lien: (1) the lien must be a judicial lien; (2) the lien 
must impair an exemption to which the debtor is entitled; and (3) the 
debtor must possess the property interest to which the lien fixed, 
before the lien was fixed on it. 73 
Some courts have focused on whether the lien is a judicial lien, 74 
or whether the lien impaired an exemption of the debtor,75 two of the 
three prongs of section 522(f)(1). However, most courts, including 
the Supreme Court in its recent decision in Farrey v. Sander/oot,76 
have focused on the third prong, which requires that the debtor pos­
sess the interest in the exempt property prior to the attachment of the 
lien.77 Some of these courts have held that the specific divorce lien 
involved could not be avoided because the creditor spouse possessed 
an ownership interest, either legal or equitable, in the exempt property 
prior to the divorce, and that the attachment of the lien simultane­
ously with the transfer of the home essentially transformed the credi­
tor spouse's pre-existing ownership interest into that of a mortgage.78 
Other courts have held that the divorce lien involved could be avoided 
on the basis that the divorce decree extinguished any pre-existing in­
terest of the non-debtor spouse. Consequently, the divorce lien at­
tached only to the debtor's interest in the property and not to any pre­
existing interest of the non-debtor.79 The Supreme Court granted cer­
tiorari in In re Sander/oot to resolve the conflict in the lower courts 
73. See supra note 4 for text of 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1). 
74. For cases holding that a divorce lien is a judicial lien, see Stedman v. Pederson 
(In re Pederson), 875 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1989); Maus v. Maus, 837 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 
1988); In re Boggess, 105 B.R. 470 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1989); In re Brothers, 100 B.R. 565 
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1989). 
For cases holding that a divorce lien is not a judicial lien, see Borman v. Leiker (In re 
Borman), 886 F.2d 273 (10th Cir. 1989) (equitable lien); Parker v. Donahue (In re Dona­
hue), 862 F.2d 259 (10th Cir. 1988) (same); Boyd v. Robinson, 741 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 
1984) (mortgage); Wicks v. Wicks, 26 B.R. 769 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1982) (consensual lien). 
75. Most of the earlier cases dealing with divorce liens either did not address this 
element or gave it cursory reference. Recently, this element has become the main focus of a 
few cases which held that the divorce lien could not be avoided. See In re Stone, 119 B.R. 
222 (Bankr. B.D. Wash. 1990); Holtzhauser v. Holtzhauser (In re Holtzhauser), 117 B.R. 
519 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1990). 
76. III S. Ct. 1825 (1991). 
77. See supra note 4 for text of 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(l). 
78. Borman v. Leiker (In re Borman), 886 F.2d 273 (10th Cir. 1989); Boyd v. Robin­
son, 741 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1984); see infra notes 86-113, 176-87 and accompanying text. 
79. Farrey v. Sanderfoot (In re Sanderfoot), 899 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 111 
S. Ct. 1825 (1991); Stedman v. Pederson (In re Pederson), 875 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1989); 
Maus v. Maus, 837 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1988); see infra notes 114-39, 166-75,207-20 and 
accompanying text. 
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regarding the interpretation and application of section 522(f)(1) to 
liens on marital property created at the time of divorce. 
A. 	 Two Conflicting Interpretations ofSection 522(f)(l) in the 
Courts ofAppeals: Boyd v. Robinson 80 and In re 
Sandeifoot 81 
The two major conflicting interpretations of section 522(f)(1) are 
exemplified by Boyd v. Robinson 82 and In re Sandeifoot. 83 The Court 
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the first court of appeals to address 
this issue, held in Boyd that the lien was not avoidable.84 In contrast, 
in Sandeifoot, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit allowed 
avoidance of the divorce lien.8s 
1. Boyd v. Robinson86 
In Boyd, the former wife (Boyd) purchased the marital home 
prior to the marriage and retained title in her name. In the divorce 
proceeding, the court found that the home was "partially marital 
property"87 and granted Boyd the home "subject to a lien for one-half 
of the equity [acquired] by the parties together after marriage. "88 The 
amount of this lien was $7000.89 Shortly after the divorce decree, 
Boyd filed for bankruptcy and sought to avoid her ex-husband's 
(Robinson) lien under section 522(f)(I).90 The bankruptcy court, in 
80. 741 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1984). 
81. 899 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'd, III S. Ct. 1825 (1991). 
82. 741 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1984). 
The issue of avoidance of a divorce lien was not addressed again by a federal court of 
appeals until 1988. In Maus v. Maus, 837 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1988), the Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit allowed a wife, in possession of the home free and clear of any and all 
claims of the other spouse, to avoid the divorce lien held by her husband. Id. at 939. In 
1989, both the Ninth and the Tenth Circuits addressed the issue. The Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit, in Stedman v. Pederson (In re Pederson), 875 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1989), 
allowed a husband to avoid a divorce lien held by his wife on the basis of the reasoning in 
the dissent in Boyd. Id. at 783. The Tenth Circuit, in Borman v. Leiker (In re Borman), 
886 F.2d 273 (lOth Cir. 1989), severely limited its decision in Maus one year earlier when it 
held the debtor-husband could not avoid his former wife's divorce lien. Id. at 274. 
In 1990, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed the issue in Farrey v. 
Sanderfoot (In re Sanderfoot), 899 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'd, III S. Ct. 1825 (1991). 
83. 	 899 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'd, III S. Ct. 1825 (199\). 
84. Boyd, 741 F.2d at 1115. 
85. Sander/oot, 899 F.2d at 605. 
86. 	 741 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1984). 
87. Boyd v. Robinson (In re Boyd), 31 B.R. 591, 593 (D. Minn. 1983), aff'd, 741 
F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1984). 
88. Boyd, 741 F.2d at 1113 (citing the Designated Record (D.R.) 27). 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
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allowing Boyd to avoid the lien, held that the lien was a judiciallien91 
and, therefore, subject to avoidance under section 522(f)(1).92 The 
district court reversed because it saw the lien not as a judicial lien but 
rather as an equitable mortgage,93 which did not impair Boyd's inter­
est in the home but instead represented Robinson's pre-existing inter­
est in the property under Minnesota statutory law.94 This decision 
was upheld on appeal. 95 
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that section 
522(f)(1) permits a debtor to avoid a lien if (1) the lien attaches to an 
interest of the debtor in exempt property; and (2) the lien is a judicial 
lien.96 As to the first requirement, the court held that Robinson (cred­
itor) had a pre-existing interest in the homestead that was created 
under the Minnesota statutes and that antedated the divorce.97 Addi­
tionally, the court held that the divorce lien attached to this pre-ex­
isting interest, rather than to Boyd's interest, which was created by the 
divorce. Therefore, that lien could not be avoided under section 
522(f)(1).98 
The court gave three reasons supporting its determination that 
Robinson's lien attached to his pre-existing interest in the home rather 
than to the debtor spouse's interest. First, in order to convey a home­
stead in Minnesota, the signatures of both spouses are necessary on the 
deed even if title to the home is held only by one spouse. Accordingly, 
when he married Boyd, Robinson "acquired an interest in the home­
stead by which he could either approve or reject the conveyance of the 
91. II U.S.C. § 101(32) (1988) defines "judicial lien" as "a lien obtained by judg­
ment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding." Id. 
92. Boyd, 741 F.2d at 1113. Contra Wicks v. Wicks, 26 B.R. 769 (Bankr. D. Minn. 
1982). Wicks was decided on the same day by the same bankruptcy court that decided 
Boyd. In Wicks, the court held the divorce lien was not avoidable under § 522(f)(1). Id. at 
772. Wicks had the same basic fact pattern and issue as Boyd; the only difference was that 
in Wicks the divorce lien was agreed to by stipUlation of the parties instead of ordered by 
the family court in a contested divorce. Id. at 771. 
93. An "equitable mortgage" is "[a]ny agreement to post certain property as security 
before the security agreement is formalized." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 539 (6th ed. 
1990). For the definition of "mortgage", see infra note 112 and accompanying text. 
94. Boyd v. Robinson (In re Boyd), 31 B.R. 591, 594-95 (D. Minn. 1983), aff'd, 741 
F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1984). For applicable statutory language, see infra notes 103-04 and 
accompanying text. 
95. Boyd, 741 F.2d at IllS. 
96. Id. at 1112-13. The court did not specifically address the third element of 
§ 522(f)(1), which is whether the lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor is entitled, 
although the district court did address the third element. Since the court of appeals de­
cided that the lien did not attach to Boyd's interest in the home, it follows that the lien 
could not have impaired Boyd's homestead exemption. 
97. Id. at 1114. 
98. Id. at 1113-14. 
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homestead."99 Second, Robinson used his own nonmarital funds to 
construct a driveway and a garage during the marriage, thereby gain­
ing a partial ownership interest. loo Finally, because Minnesota's di­
vorce statutes require a " 'just and equitable division of the marital 
property,' ... Robinson had an undivided [ownership] interest in [as 
much of] the equity ofthe homestead [as was] acquired through mari­
tal funds."lOl 
Since the court of appeals decided that the first requirement 
clearly was not met according to Minnesota statutory law, the court 
did not directly decide the second issue, which was whether this lien 
was a judicial lien. However, the court did refer to two state statutes 
that in essence equate a divorce lien with an equitable mortgage. 102 
One statute defines "mortgage" to include "a decree of marriage disso­
lution or an instrument made pursuant to it,"103 and the other statute 
indicates that "a decree of marriage dissolution or an instrument made 
pursuant to it, relating to real estate shall be valid as security for any 
debt." 104 The court stated that the purpose of the statutes was to 
provide spouses with greater protection for property rights "created 
during the marriage and determined [later] in a dissolution 
proceeding."105 
In dissent, Judge Ross maintained that the lien should have been 
avoided even though "permitting avoidance of this lien is a harsh re­
sult."I06 Judge Ross first argued that under Minnesota law the di­
vorce decree granted the property outright to Boyd, ending any 
interest Robinson had in the marital property. Therefore, the only 
interest to which the lien could attach was Boyd's.107 Robinson's in­
terest in the marital home was dissolved by the divorce decree and 
became nothing more than collateral for Boyd's property settlement 
debt. lOS 
Furthermore, on the second issue, the dissent argued that Robin­
son's lien was a "judicial lien" as defined in the Code. The Code de­
99. Id. at 1114. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.58 (West Supp. 1984». 
102. Id. at 1113-14. For a discussion of whether a divorce lien is an equitable lien or 
an equitable mortgage, see Parker v. Donahue (In re Donahue), 862 F.2d 259 (10th Cir. 
1988). 
103. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 287.01(3) (West 1991). 
104. Id. § 287.03 (emphasis added). 
105. Boyd, 741 F.2d at 1114. 
106. Id. at 1116 (Ross, J., dissenting). 
107. Id. at 1115. 
108. Id. 
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fines "lien" as a "charge against or interest in property to secure 
payment of a debt or performance of an obligation,"l09 and "judicial 
lien" as a "lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other 
legal or equitable process or proceeding."110 The dissent stated that 
Robinson's lien, an interest in property to secure a debt, was created 
by the judgment of the divorce court, not by agreement of the parties 
(a consensual security interest)lll nor through a contract or convey­
ance (a mortgage).112 Therefore, the dissent argued that Robinson's 
lien must have been a judicia1lien. 113 
2. In re Sander/oat 114 
In re Sander/oat represents the most recent United States court of 
appeals decision on the issue of whether a debtor spouse can avoid a 
former spouse's divorce lien on the marital home pursuant to section 
522(f)(1). In 1986, after twenty years of marriage Gerald Sanderfoot 
and Jeanne Farrey divorced. Pursuant to their divorce decree, the 
court assigned various assets and debts to the parties. The court 
awarded the marital home, which the couple had held as joint tenants, 
to the husband, Sanderfoot.llS After these assignments were made, 
Mr. Sanderfoot had an estate of $59,508.79, while Ms. Farrey had an 
estate worth $1091.90}16 In order to secure a more equitable distribu­
tion of the marital property, as was required by state law, 117 the court 
ordered Mr. Sanderfoot to pay Ms. Farrey approximately $29,000, in 
two equal installments. 1 IS This debt was to be secured by a lien in 
109. 11 U.S.C. § 101(33) (1988). 
110. Id. § 101(32). 
111. A "consensuaIlien" is a secured claim that is created by the consent and agree­
ment "between the debtor and the creditor and called a 'security interest' by the Code." 
United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240 (1989). 
112. A "mortgage" is "an interest in land created by a written instrument providing 
security for ... the payment ofa debt." BLACK'S LAW DICflONARY 1009 (6th ed. 1990). 
Some courts have held that divorce liens are equitable mortgages or liens, even though 
they are created by a court. See Borman v. Leiker (In re Borman), 886 F.2d 273 (10th Cir. 
1989); Parker v. Donahue (In re Donahue), 862 F.2d 259 (lOth Cir. 1988); Hart v. Hart (In 
re Hart), 50 B.R. 956 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1985); Hartley v. Liberty Park Assocs., 774 P.2d 40 
(Wash. App. 1989). 
113. Boyd v. Robinson, 741 F.2d 1112, 1116 (8th Cir. 1984) (Ross, J., dissenting). 
114. 899 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1825 (1991). 
115. Id. at 599. Farrey was granted "half the refund and/or liability with respect to 
the couple's 1985 income taxes, certain personal property, and half the proceeds of items 
ordered sold at auction." Id. 
116. Id. 
117. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.255 (West 1981). 
118. Sander/oat, 899 F.2d at 599. 
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favor of Ms. Farrey on the marital home.119 
Four months later ·Sanderfoot filed for bankruptcy and attempted 
to avoid his ex-wife's lien on the home by claiming that it impaired his 
homestead exemption. 120 In denying Sanderfoot's motion to avoid, 
the bankruptcy court primarily relied on the language and legislative 
history of section 522(f)( 1),121 and on Boyd, because it saw Wisconsin 
case law as similar to Minnesota statutory law. 122 
On appeal, the district court reversed and allowed Sanderfoot to 
avoid the lien. 123 The court stated, with little discussion, that the lien 
was a judicial lien that impaired Sanderfoot's homestead exemption, 
and that the divorce decree extinguished whatever pre-existing inter­
ests the parties had and created new ones. 124 Therefore, Sanderfoot 
had met the three prongs of section 522(f)(1) and could avoid his 
wife's lien.12S The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed 
the district court's decision. 126 
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit based its decision 
on the district court's holding, but discussed each prong of section 
522(f)(1) in greater detail. First, the court of appeals concluded that 
the lien attached to Sanderfoot's interest in the homestead property. 127 
119. Id. The lien was to remain until the debt was paid in full. At the time 
Sanderfoot filed for bankruptcy, he had not paid anything to Farrey. Id. 
120. Since Wisconsin did not "opt out" under § 522(b)(2)(A), Sanderfoot had the 
option of choosing either the federal homestead exemption or Wisconsin's homestead ex­
emption. II U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (1988). See supra note 40. Sanderfoot chose his state 
homestead exemption (up to $40,000) instead of the federal homestead exemption (up to 
$7500). Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d at 599. 
121. In re Sanderfoot, 83 B.R. 564, 567 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1988), rev'd, 92 B.R. 802 
(E.D. Wis.), ajJ'd sub nom. Farrey v. Sanderfoot (In re Sanderfoot), 899 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 
1990), rev'd, III S. Ct. 1825 (1991). The court focused specifically on the phrase "fixing of 
a lien on an interest of the debtor." Id. The court held that because the statute used 
"fixing" instead of "fixed," and "interest" instead of "property" Congress intended that a 
debtor would be able to avoid "liens that became fixed after the debtor's acquisition of the 
interest in the property, not before." Id. 
122. Id. at 568. The court stated that although "Wisconsin does not have a statute 
defining this type of lien as a mortgage, ... state case law accomplishes the same result." 
Id. 
123. In re Sanderfoot, 92 B.R. 802, 803 (E.D. Wis. 1988), ajJ'd sub nom. Farrey v. 
Sanderfoot (In re Sanderfoot), 899 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'd, III S. Ct. 1825 (1991). 
124. Id. "New interests were simultaneously created: title in the homestead was 
given to Mr. Sanderfoot, and Mrs. Sanderfoot acquired a lien on that property." Id. 
125. Id. 
126. Farrey v. Sanderfoot (In re Sanderfoot), 899 F.2d 598, 599 (7th Cir. 1990), 
rev'd, III S. Ct. 1825 (1991). 
127. Id. at 601-03. The court relied heavily on Maus v. Maus, 837 F.2d 935 (10th 
Cir. 1988), in determining that Farrey's pre-existing interest in the home was terminated 
before Farrey's lien was imposed on the property. For a discussion of Maus, see infra notes 
166 -75 and accompanying text. 
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Next, the court. held that the lien impaired Sanderfoot's homestead 
exemption. 128 Finally, the court held the lien was a judicial lien. 129 In 
its conclusion, the court stated it recognized the policy arguments 
against avoidance, but claimed "clear legislative judgment" prohibited 
it from deciding otherwise. 130 
Judge Posner dissented. Embracing the result in Boyd, he argued 
that while institutional considerations sometimes override the equities 
ofjustice, such considerations were not compelling in this case.131 In a 
scathing opinion, he asserted that section 522(f)(I) had become, in the 
divorce context, a "tool by which bounders defraud their spouses"132 
and "a tactic designed to nullify (or perhaps to complete nullification 
of) the divorce decree and give the [debtor spouse] all rather than half 
the property."133 Stressing that the decision to avoid these liens was a 
result of "judicial misunderstanding" of the lien-avoidance provision, 
he referred to the history and purpose of lien avoidance in the Code. 134 
He further stated that since the statute refers to "the fixing of" a 
lien on a debtor's interest in property, the statute requires that the 
debtor possess that interest before the court "fixes" the lien on it. 13S 
Since Sanderfoot and Farrey had held the property as joint tenants 
prior to the divorce, at no time before the divorce (and attachment of 
the lien) did only one spouse have an interest in the property. More­
over, the divorce decree did not extinguish Farrey's pre-existing inter­
est, but changed it to a different form of interest-a mortgage 
interest. 136 
Judge Posner further declared, "I am at a loss to understand why 
we should strain the language and ignore the purpose of the lien­
avoidance statute in order to achieve a result that does not promote, 
but instead denies, simple justice ...."137 Upholding the lien would 
not create any tension "between legal justice and substantive justice"; 
128. Since Ms. Farrey did not address this issue, the court detennined she had 
waived any right to challenge it. Sander/oot, 899 F.2d at 603. 
129. Id. at 603-05. The court used the definitions of lien and judicial lien as found in 
the Code. Id. See also Stedman v. Pederson (In re Pederson), 875 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 
1989); Maus v. Maus, 837 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1988). 
130. Sander/oat, 899 F.2d at 605. 
131. Id. at 606 (posner, J., dissenting). 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. Judge Posner agreed that the Farrey-Sanderfoot divorce lien was a judicial 
lien, but contended that divorce liens are generally created to protect a spouse's pre-existing 
property rights, not to defeat the debtor's homestead exemptions. Id. 
135. Id. at 606. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. at 607. 
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instead, he argued, it would fulfill the purpose of Congress that is em­
bodied in the lien-avoidance provision. 13B He concluded that the re­
sult reached by the majority distorted the Code by allowing the debtor 
to make a "fresh start with someone else's property."139 
B. The Supreme Court Decision 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in In re Sander/oot 140 to 
resolve the conflict in the lower courts as to the interpretation and 
application of section 522(f)(1) to divorce liens. In a unanimous deci­
sion, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
and held that section 522(f)(1) "requires a debtor to have possessed an 
interest to which a lien attached, before it attached, to avoid the fixing 
of the lien on that interest."141 The Court ruled that Sanderfoot had 
never possessed his fee simple interest in the home prior to the fixing 
of Farrey's divorce lien.142 Consequently, Sanderfoot could not em­
ploy section 522(f)(1) to avoid his wife's lien. 
To support its holding, the Court referred to the provision's lan­
guage and legislative history. The Court began with an analysis of the 
language of section 522(f)(1), concentrating solely on its third 
prong. 143 The Court maintained that the only question necessary to a 
decision was whether section 522(f)(I) permitted Sanderfoot to "avoid 
the fixing" of Farrey's lien on the property interest that Sanderfoot 
acquired in the divorce decree. l44 Focusing specifically on the stan­
dard legal meaning of the verbs "avoid" and "fix," the Court stated 
that the use of "[t]he gerund 'fixing; [in the statute] refers to a tempo­
ral event. That event-the fastening of a liability-presupposes an ob­
ject onto which the liability can fasten."14S The Court then concluded 
that unless a debtor had the specific property interest to which the lien 
attached prior to the lien's attachment, the debtor could not avoid the 
lien under section 522(f)(I).146 
The Court supported its interpretation of the provision by exam­
138. Id. 
139. Id. at 607-08. 
140. 899 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1990), rey'd, III S. Ct. 1825 (1991). 
141. Farrey v. Sanderfoot, III S. Ct. 1825, 1831 (1991). 
142. Id. 
143. See supra note 4 for text of II U.S.C. § 522(f)(I). 
144. Farrey, III S. Ct. at 1828. The Court did not analyze the first two prongs of 
§ 522(f)(I) since Ms. Farrey had not challenged that her lien was a judicial lien and had 
"waived any challenge [that Mr. Sanderfoot was not] entitled to a homestead exemption 
under state law." Id. 
145. Id. at 1829. 
146. Id. 
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ining the provision's purpose and legislative history. Acknowledging 
that the broad purpose of section 522(f) was to protect the debtor's 
exempt property, the Court pointed out that when the provision was 
enacted "it was well settled ... that valid liens obtained before bank­
ruptcy could be enforced on exempt property."147 Through the Bank­
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Congress essentially preserved this 
principle. However, Congress also gave the debtor some relief by al­
lowing him or her to avoid the fixing of certain liens-among them, 
judicial liens fixed on an interest of a debtor in exempt property. 148 
The Court reasoned that Congress had singled out judicial liens 
in order to protect debtors from unsecured creditors who rushed into 
court to obtain liens on debtor's exempt property prior to the debtor's 
entry into bankruptcy.'49 The Court buttressed this theory by refer­
ring to the provision's legislative history. ISO However, the Court 
maintained that this is not what occurs in a divorce proceeding. Far­
rey obtained the lien not to "defeat Sanderfoot's pre-existing interest 
in the homestead but to protect her own pre-existing interest in the 
homestead" which was fully equal to that of Sanderfoot. ls, 
Adopting Judge Posner's analysis, the Court stated that "the crit­
ical inquiry [is] whether the debtor ever possessed the interest to which 
the lien fixed, before it fixed"ls2 and that this inquiry is a question of 
state law. ls3 Consequently, the Court found that under Wisconsin law 
the divorce decree extinguished both Mr. Sanderfoot's and Ms. Far­
rey's pre-existing undivided half interests and granted the property to 
Sanderfoot " 'free and clear' of any claim 'except as expressly provided 
in this [divorce decree].' "IS4 Sanderfoot received his new interest and 
the lien simultaneously, "as if he had purchased an already encum­
bered estate from a third party."ISS Therefore, Sanderfoot never pos­
147. Id. (citations omitted). 
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 126, 126-27 (1978), re­
printed in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6087-88). see supra notes 45-56 and accompanying 
text for a discussion of the legislative history of II U.S.C. § 522. 
151. Farrey, III S. Ct. at 1831. 
152. Id. at 1830. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. 58a, Farrey v. Sanderfoot (In re Sanderfoot), 
899 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1990) (No. 90-350), rev'd, III S. Ct. 1825 (1991». 
155. Id. at 1830-31. The Court found that Mr. Sanderfoot could not avoid the lien 
even if the divorce decree had not extinguished the couple's pre-existing interests, but 
merely reordered them, i.e., adding Ms. Farrey'S pre-existing interest to that of Mr. 
Sanderfoot. Id. at 1831. Since the lien attached to Ms. Farrey's pre-existing interest, when 
Mr. Sanderfoot received that interest, it was already with the lien in place. He "would 
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sessed his new fee simple interest before Farrey's lien was fixed on 
it.ls6 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy contended that the 
Court's holding left open the possibility that future cases could pro­
duce a different result because much "depend[s] upon the relevant 
state laws defining the estate owned by a spouse who had a pre-ex­
isting interest in marital property and upon state laws governing 
awards of property under a decree settling marital rights." I S7 Accord­
ing to Wisconsin state law, all property of spouses is presumed to be 
marital property and each spouse possesses a present undivided one­
half interest in the marital property. ISS Justice Kennedy interpreted 
Wisconsin law as reordering, rather than extinguishing, the spouses' 
pre-existing interests. Consequently, according to Justice Kennedy, 
but for Mr. Sanderfoot's concession that the divorce decree extin­
guished these interests, the debtor would· have both retained his pre­
existing interest and received his wife's pre-existing interest at the di­
vorce, whereupon these two interests would have merged into one es­
tate. IS9 Therefore, "as a matter of state law the judicial lien could ... 
attach to [Sanderfoot's] predecree interest ... in the marital prop­
erty" and be at least partially avoided under section 522(f).I60 
Justice Kennedy therefore concluded that the possibility still ex­
ists that the Code could be misused to avoid otherwise valid obliga­
tions under a divorce court decree. He warned, 
[although] adept drafting of property decrees or the use of court 
orders directing conveyances in a certain sequence might resolve the 
problem, . . . congressional action may be necessary to avoid in 
some future case the ... unjust result the Court today avoids having 
to consider only because of the fortuity of [Mr. Sanderfoot's] 
concession. 161 
Although the Court unanimously held that Mr. Sanderfoot could 
not avoid his former wife's lien, the decision is narrow. First, the 
Court only addressed one of the three elements that section 522(f)(1) 
requires a debtor to meet in order to avoid a lien. 162 Second, in reach-
never have [possession of that interest] without the lien already having [been] fixed." Id. 
Justice Scalia did not join in this alternate holding. Id. at 1831 n.4. 
156. Id. at 1830-31. 
157. Id. at 1832. 
158. Id. (citing WIS. STAT. § 766.31(2)-(3} (1989)}. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. See supra note 155 for the majority's response to Justice Kennedy's view. 
161. Farrey, 111 S. Ct. at 1832-33. 
162. See supra note 4 and accompanying text for the three elements of § 522(f)(1}. 
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ing its decision on this one element, the Court relied heavily on several 
variables including the form of ownership in which the spouse held the 
marital home prior to divorce, how the applicable state law views mar­
ital property at the time of divorce, the wording used in the divorce 
decree, and a court's interpretation as to the timing of the fixing of the 
lien. The Court's reliance on these factors is very significant since in 
certain situations a debtor spouse will still be able to manipulate the 
Code to avoid a former spouse's divorce lien through use of section 
522(f)(I). A look at divorce liens in a post-Farrey world illuminates 
the remaining grey areas associated with the application of section 
522(f)(I) to divorce liens. 
III. THE IMPACT OF FARREY ON FUTURE DIVORCE LIENS 
The Supreme Court's decision in Farrey attempted to resolve the 
conflict in the lower courts regarding the application of section 
522(f)(I) to divorce liens. According to Farrey, in order to avoid a 
divorce lien under section 522(f)(I) a debtor must possess the interest 
to which the lien is fixed prior to the lien's attachment. 163 While this 
rule reaches the fair and equitable result in this case, it will not do so 
in all situations where divorce liens exist. 
Furthermore, while Farrey resolved some of the conflict as to the 
third prong of the provision, it did not end the confusion as to the 
other two prongs. The following Section examines the impact of Far­
rey on future divorce liens in the context of the factual situations 
presented by the four courts of appeals' cases decided before Farrey. 
This examination primarily focuses on the form of ownership (joint 
tenancy or sole ownership) in which the home is held and the effect of 
state law on determining the timing of the attachment of the lien. In 
examining these factors, this Section· incorporates the role of equitable 
distribution law in determining a debtor spouse's interest in marital 
property and the question of whether divorce liens are "judicial liens" 
as required under section 522(f)(1). 
A. Joint Tenancies: Maus v. Maus l64 and In re Borman 16S 
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit decided both Maus 
and Borman. Although both cases involved marital homes that were 
held in joint tenancies, the court in Maus allowed the wife to avoid her 
163. Farrey, III S. Ct. at 1830. 
164. 837 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1988). 
165. 886 F.2d 273 (10th Cir. 1989). 
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husband's lien, while in Borman the court did not allow the husband 
to avoid his former wife's lien. 
1. Maus v. Maus l66 
In Maus, the spouses reached a verbal property settlement which 
was incorporated into the divorce decree. Nikki Maus (the wife) was 
granted the home "free and clear of any and all claims" of Jesse Maus 
(her former husband). 167 Nikki was also ordered to pay Jesse $22,000 
in order to achieve an equitable distribution of the marital property.168 
Three years later, Nikki filed for bankruptcy and claimed the home as 
exempt property.169 She listed the $22,000 obligation to Jesse as an 
unsecured debt, but in case the obligation was viewed as a lien, she 
sought to have it avoided under section 522(f)(I).170 
The bankruptcy court held that the debt was a consensual lien 
created by the consent and agreement of the parties in the property 
settlement and, therefore, not avoidable under section 522(f)(1) since 
the provision only applies to judicial liens. l7l However, the district 
court held that the lien was a judicial lien and allowed Nikki to avoid 
it. l72 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. First, the 
court agreed that the lien was a judicial lien. 173 Then, the court found 
that the divorce decree extinguished Jesse's pre-existing interest in the 
property as the decree specifically stated that Nikki was to get the 
home free and clear of any and all claims of her husband. 174 Conse­
quently, the court concluded that the lien could only have attached to 
Nikki's interest in the homeY!! 
2. In re Borman 176 
In In re Borman, pursuant to the divorce decree, the former wife 
was allowed to retain possession of the home and make mortgage pay­
166. 837 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1988). 
167. Id. at 937 (quoting from the Maus' property settlement agreement, which was 
incorporated in the divorce decree). 
168. Id. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. See supra note 111 for a definition of consensual lien. 
172. Maus, 837 F.2d at 937. 
173. The court stated that, under Kansas law, any obligation arising under chapter 
60 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated is considered a judicial lien, and since divorce pro­
ceedings are commenced under chapter 60, the husband's claim was considered a judicial 
lien. Id. at 938. 
174. Id. at 939. 
175. Id. 
176. 886 F.2d 273 (10th Cir. 1989). 
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ments until the house was appraised. 177 After the appraisal, the hus­
band was to pay the wife one-half of the appraised value and then 
receive title to the house. 178 On the husband's motion, the trial court 
modified the divorce decree to require the husband to pay the wife 
approximately $19,000 as a condition for receiving title to the 
house. 179 The debt to the ex-wife was to be secured by a lien on the 
marital home, which had been held in a joint tenancy.180 However, 
when the cash settlement was due, Mr. Borman filed for bankruptcy 
and claimed a homestead exemption on the house. 181 Subsequently, 
Borman filed a motion to avoid his former wife's lien. 182 The bank­
ruptcy court allowed Borman to avoid his wife's lien and the district 
court affirmed. 183 
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed and held 
that the divorce lien could not be avoided. 184 The court determined 
that the divorce lien was an equitable lien and that avoidance of it 
would lead to unjust enrichment of the debtor spouse since "it [was] 
clear the property was intended to be the source from which the debt 
would be paid."18s The court, adopting the rationale it employed in In 
re Donahue, 186 distinguished its earlier decision in Maus by stating 
that "the critical difference [was] that the decree in Maus awarded the 
property to the debtor spouse free and clear of any claims of the non­
debtor spouse." 187 
177. Id. at 273. 
178. Id. at 273-74. 
179. Id. at 274. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. The wife did not object to the husband's claimed exemption. Id. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. at 274. In reaching its holding, the Borman court relied predominately on 
the reasoning in Parker v. Donahue (In re Donahue), 862 F.2d 259 (lOth Cir. 1988). Dona~ 
hue did not deal directly with the question of avoidance of a divorce lien, but rather 
whether such a lien was an equitable lien or equitable mortgage. The Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit held that where a divorce decree intends, either implicitly or explicitly, 
that a specific property of one spouse secure a debt to the other spouse, the decree creates 
an equitable lien upon that property. Id. at 265-66. Use of the term "lien" was not neces­
sary in the divorce agreement. Alternative words, such as "subject to," that establish that 
the property was to be security for the debt are sufficient. Id. at 265 n.9. The court held 
that whether the creditor spouse's interest was called an equitable lien or an equitable mort­
gage, the debt was secured. Id. at 266. 
185. Borman, 886 F.2d at 274. 
186. 862 F.2d 259 (10th Cir. 1988). 
187. Borman, 886 F.2d at 274. 
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3. Application of Farrey to Joint Tenancies 
Like Farrey, Maus and Borman involved homesteads held during 
marriage as joint tenancies. Also like Farrey, Maus and Borman in­
volved divorce decrees that extinguished the spouses' pre-existing un­
divided half interests, created new property interests for each spouse 
who was granted the home, and created divorce liens for the other 
spouse. 188 Based on these similarities, it would seem that after Farrey 
divorce liens in joint tenancy situations like Maus and Borman would 
not be avoided, just as the Farrey lien was not avoided. 
This result is clear in Borman, but is less obvious in Maus. In 
Borman, under the modified divorce decree the husband was not to 
receive full title to the house until after he had paid his debt to his ex­
wife. 189 Even before the divorce decree was modified, the house was to 
be held in a joint tenancy until the husband paid the wife one-half of 
the appraised value}90 Therefore, under Farrey, the husband would 
never have "possessed the interest to which the lien fixed, before it 
fixed,"19l and thus could not have avoided his wife's lien. 
In Maus, the spouses similarly had held the home in a joint ten­
ancy prior to the divorce and, after the divorce, one spouse (the wife, 
Nikki) possessed the home with her husband's lien attached. Seem­
ingly, Farrey would prevent Nikki from avoiding her former hus­
band's lien. However, in Farrey, the Supreme Court recognized that 
the critical question of when the debtor came into possession of the 
interest to which the divorce lien attached was a question of state 
law. 192 Under Kansas law (controlling in Maus), on the filing of a 
divorce petition, "each spouse becomes the owner of a vested, but un­
determined, interest in all property individually or jointly held. . . . 
[However], [t]he court may cut off all of a spouse's rights to property 
by using specific language."193 This was done in the Maus decree. 
Unlike Farrey, where the divorce decree stated that Mr. 
Sanderfoot acquired the property" 'free and clear' of any claim 'ex­
cept as expressly provided in this [decree},' "194 the Maus' divorce de­
cree stated that Nikki was "hereby granted [the marital home] as her 
sole and separate property free and clear of any and all claims of 
188. See supra notes 166-87 and accompanying text. 
189. Borman, 886 F.2d at 274. 
190. Id. at 273-74. 
191. Farrey v. Sanderfoot, III S. Ct. 1825, 1830 (1991). 
192. Id. 
193. Maus v. Maus, 837 F.2d 935,939 (10th Cir. 1988). 
194. Farrey, III S. Ct. at 1830 (emphasis added). 
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[Jesse)."19S While Sanderfoot "took [his new] interest and the lien to­
gether, as ... an already encumbered estate,"196 it can be argued that 
Nikki first acquired an unencumbered estate and then Jesse's lien was 
fixed upon it. Because Jesse's lien could only have attached to Nikki's 
interest, it would be subject to avoidance under section 522(f)(1) even 
after Farrey. 
While this argument for avoidance of Jesse's lien essentially puts 
form over substance and disregards the intent of Nikki and Jesse Maus 
prior to the drafting of the divorce decree, this kind of interpretation 
and result has not been eliminated by Fa"ey. Although "adept draft­
ing" can mitigate and possibly eliminate this potential problem in joint 
tenancy situations, sole ownerships present a more difficult problem. 
B. Sole Ownership: Boyd v. Robinson 197 and In re Pederson 198 
Both Boyd and Pederson involved homes that were purchased by 
one spouse prior to marriage and held solely by that spouse during the 
marriage. Each home was granted to the spouse who had originally 
purchased the home. However, in Boyd the court did not allow the 
wife to avoid her ex-husband's lien, while in Pederson the court al­
lowed the husband to avoid his ex-wife's lien. 
1. Boyd v. Robinson 199 
In Boyd v. Robinson, title to the home was held solely by the wife 
(Boyd) since she had purchased the home prior to the marriage.2oo In 
the divorce proceeding Boyd was awarded the home "subject to a lien 
for one-half of the equity acquired by the parties together after mar­
riage."201 Boyd filed a petition for bankruptcy and tried to avoid her 
195. Maus, 837 F.2d at 937. When a divorce decree awards a home "free and clear 
of all claims" of the former spouse, it had generally been held that the spouse who retained 
the home had the only interest in the home and the divorce lien attached to that interest. 
See. e.g., id. at 937-39. However, when a divorce settlement awards the home "subject to" 
the lien of the other spouse and it is clear that the home is to be the source of funds to 
effectuate the division of the marital property, some courts have created an equitable lien in 
favor of the non-debtor spouse and generally held it could not be avoided. Borman v. 
Leiker (In re Borman), 886 F.2d 273, 274 (10th Cir. 1989). See supra note 184 for further 
discussion of equitable liens and treatment of them by the courts. 
196. Fa"ey, III S. Ct. at 1830. 
197. 741 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1984). 
198. 875 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1989). 
199. 741 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1984). See supra notes 86-113 for a more detailed 
discussion of Boyd. 
200. Boyd, 741 F.2d at 1113. 
201. Id. (citing to the Designated Record (D.R.) 27). 
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ex-husband's divorce lien under section 522(f)(I).202 The bankruptcy 
court classified his lien as a judicial lien and allowed Boyd to avoid her 
ex-husband's lien.203 The district court reversed as it determined the 
lien was an equitable mortgage rather than a judicial lien.204 
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the 
court held that Boyd could not avoid the lien that her ex-husband 
(Robinson) held on the marital home since the lien attached to Robin­
son's pre-existing interesVos In reaching this conclusion, the court 
primarily relied on the Minnesota statutory law that created Robin­
son's pre-existing interest.206 
2. In re Pederson 207 
In the dissolution decree for the marriage of Earnest Pederson 
and Bonnie Stedman the state court granted the marital home to Ped­
erson as his "sole and separate property."208 Prior to the marriage, 
Pederson owned the marital home as his separate property.209 How­
ever, in recognition that certain improvements had been made out of 
marital funds, Stedman was granted an $8000 lien to run "against the 
real property."210 Less than three weeks after the divorce decree was 
finalized, Pederson filed for bankruptcy, claimed a homestead exemp­
tion and moved to avoid Stedman's lien on the home pursuant to sec­
tion 522(f)(1).211 The bankruptcy court denied the motion.212 The 
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reversed the bankruptcy court's decision 
and avoided Stedman's lien.213 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed.214 
The court of appeals noted three reasons in support of its deci­
sion. First, based on the definitions of lien and judicial lien in the 
202. Id. 
203. Id. 
204. Boyd v. Robinson (In re Boyd), 31 B.R. 591, 594-95 (D. Minn. 1983),off'd, 
741 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1984). 
205. Boyd, 741 F.2d at 1113-14. See supra notes 97-105 and accompanying text. 
206. Boyd, 741 F.2d at 1114. 
207. 875 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1989). 
208. Id. at 783 (citing In re Pederson, No. 85-3-00646-1, at 1 (Wash. Super. Ct. July 
3, 1986». The decree did not provide for alimony, support, or maintenance payments. Id. 
at 782. 
209. Id. at 782. 
210. Id. 
211. Id. 
212. Id. The bankruptcy court determined that the lien was not a judicial lien as 
defined under the Bankruptcy Code. Therefore, it was not subject to § 522(f)(1). Id. 
213. Id. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel held that Stedman's lien was a judicial 
lien under the Code and could be avoided under § 522(f)(I). Id. 
214. Id. at 782-84. 
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Code,215 the court held that the wife's lien was a judicial lien because it 
was created by a judgment and was a "charge against" the marital 
home, which was awarded to Pederson in order to secure payment of 
the equitable distribution of the marital property.216 Second, since the 
"dissolution decree clearly indicate[d] that Stedman's lien attached to 
Pederson's property [interest]," the court held that Stedman's lien im­
paired Pederson's homestead exemption.217 Finally, the court found 
that Stedman had no pre-existing interest in the homestead to which 
the divorce lien could have attached.218 The court's reasoning focused 
on the ability of a state court under Washington law to award title to 
the residence outright to one spouse.219 Since the dissolution decree 
entered by the state court specifically granted the home to Pederson as 
his "sole and separate property," at the time of the divorce only Peder­
son possessed an interest to which a lien could attach.220 
3. Application of Farrey to Sole Ownerships 
Under Farrey, the "critical inquiry [is] whether the debtor ever 
possessed the interest to which the lien fixed, before it fixed."221 
Where a sole ownership exists, only one party has title to the property. 
When a couple divorces, if the spouse with title is the spouse granted 
the marital home, arguably that spouse has and had the only property 
interest in the marital home. Therefore, that spouse possessed the in­
terest to which the lien fixed, before it fixed. Accordingly, the divorce 
lien would attach to that spouse's interest and could be avoided under 
section 522(f)(I). 
In Pederson, not only was title to the marital home in Pederson's 
name before and during the marriage, but the state court's dissolution 
order granted the home to him as his "sole and separate property. "222 
Even though Stedman (the wife) was granted a lien representing her 
"interest" in the marital home, the dissolution decree stated that her 
lien was to attach to Pederson's separate real property.223 Therefore, 
the lien attached to Pederson's "sole and separate" interest, and under 
215. See supra notes 109, 110 and accompanying text for the Code's definitions of 
lien and judicial lien, respectively. 
216. In re Pederson, 875 F.2d 781, 782 (9th Cir. 1989). 
217. Id. at 783. 
218. Id. (adopting the rationale of Maus). 
219. Id. 
220. Id. (quoting In re Pederson, No. 85-3-00646-1, at 1 (Wash. Super. Ct. July 3, 
1986». 
221. Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 111 S. Ct. 1825, 1830 (1991). 
222. Pederson, 875 F.2d at 783. 
223. Id. Although the equitable distribution law in Washington recognized that 
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Farrey's interpretation of section S22(f)(1), Pederson possessed his fee 
simple interest before the lien fixed and could avoid his wife's lien. 
The divorce lien in Boyd is more problematic. As stated before, 
the critical question under Farrey is "whether the debtor ever pos­
sessed the interest to which the lien fixed, before it fixed."224 Like 
Pederson, Boyd (the wife) held title to the marital home solely in her 
name prior to the divorce as well as after the divorce.22s Applying 
Farrey literally, Boyd possessed the specific interest to which the lien 
fixed, before the lien fixed. Consequently, the lien could be avoided 
under section S22(f)(1). 
However, title alone may not be determinative of what interest a 
spouse possessed in the marital home prior to the fixing of the lien. 
The Court, in Farrey, stated that this critical inquiry is a question of 
state law.226 Since every state has adopted some form of equitable dis­
tribution in the area of divorce law, either by statute or judicial deci­
sion,227 the doctrine must be taken into account by the bankruptcy 
courts and other federal courts when determining the "pre-existing in­
terests" of both divorcing spouses . 
. According to Minnesota statutory law (controlling in Boyd), each 
spouse has an "undivided interest in marital property from the time it 
is acquired."228 Consequently, one can argue that Robinson (Boyd's 
husband) had an interest in the marital home prior to the divorce and, 
although title to the home was solely in Boyd's name, Boyd had less 
than a fee simple interest. Moreover, the dissolution decree in Boyd 
expressly stated that Boyd was to receive the marital home "subject 
to" a lien for one-half of the equity acquired by Boyd and Robinson 
after marriage,229 in contrast to Pederson where the divorce decree 
granted the property outright to Pederson. Use of the words "subject 
to" in the divorce decree provides the argument that the divorce de­
cree first extinguished Boyd's and Robinson's pre-existing interests 
and then created for Boyd a new fee simple interest already encum­
bered by her husband's lien. Applying Farrey to this view of the prop­
erty interests, the husband's lien could not be avoided. 
Although this last approach reaches the equitable result, 
Stedman had an interest in the marital home, that interest was effectively extinguished by 
the wording used in the divorce decree. 
224. Farrey, 111 S. Ct. at 1830 (emphasis added). 
225. Boyd v. Robinson, 741 F.2d 1112, 1113 (8th Cir. 1984). 
226. Farrey, 111 S. Ct. at 1830. 
227. See supra note 63. 
228. Boyd, 741 F.2d at 1114. 
229. Id. at 1113. 
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problems do exist with it. First, the mere existence of an equitable 
distribution law may not be enough to create a pre-existing interest 
where property ostensibly belongs to one spouse. Second, even if equi­
table distribution law does create a pre-existing interest for the non­
titled spouse, the wording used in a divorce decree can be interpreted 
to have extinguished the interest created under equitable distribution 
law prior to the fixing of the lien, as was done in Pederson. 
Unfortunately, Farrey does not provide any guidance in these ar­
eas. First, Farrey dealt with property held in a joint tenancy, which 
presents fewer difficulties in determining the pre-existing interests of 
the spouses than does sole ownership. Second, and more importantly, 
Sanderfoot (the debtor spouse in Farrey) did not challenge the charac­
terization of Wisconsin law as extinguishing the prior interests of both 
spouses and creating new ones.230 Since the Court did not discuss this 
issue, the question of whether equitable distribution law can create an 
enforceable pre-existing interest in property that otherwise appears to 
belong entirely to someone else is one with which the lower courts will 
have to struggle. 
Farrey may, however, afford the lower courts a means of avoiding 
the problem of determining pre-existing interests in sole ownership sit­
uations. Since the Court did not address whether a divorce lien is a 
judicial lien,231 focusing instead on whether the lien attached to the 
debtor's interest in the marital home, the lower courts may be able to 
rely on the consensual lien theory or the equitable lien theory to re­
frain from applying section 522(f)(1) to a particular divorce lien.232 
Classification of a divorce lien as a consensual lien renders section 
522(f)(1) inapplicable since the provision only applies to judicial 
liens.233 Some courts have classified divorce liens as consensual liens 
when the liens were created by the consent and agreement of the par­
ties in their separation agreement and then incorporated by the court 
into their divorce decree as a matter of formality.234 When the 
spouses have not previously agreed to a lien and the lien is created 
entirely by the court, some courts have held that the lien is an equita­
ble lien and did not avoid the lien on that basis.23s However, in con­
230. Farrey, 111 S. Ct. at 1831-32 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
231. Ms. Farrey did not challenge the court of appeals' determination that her lien 
was .a judicial lien. Id. at 1828. 
232. See supra notes 184 -85 and accompanying text for a discussion of the equitable 
lien theory. 
233. See supra note 4 for text of 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1). 
234. See In re McCormmach, 111 B.R. 330 (Bankr. D. Or. 1990); Wicks v. Wicks, 
26 B.R. 769 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1982). 
235. See Parker v. Donahue (In re Donahue), 862 F.2d 259 (10th Cir. 1988); In re 
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trast to consensual liens which are not judicial liens, there is no 
consensus on whether equitable liens are judicial liens.236 
Nevertheless, the same interpretation problems that exist with de­
termining a debtor's interest in the marital home also exist in deter­
mining whether a divorce lien is a judicial lien. When the wording 
used in the divorce decree awards the property to the debtor spouse 
free and clear of any claims of the non-debtor spouse, this wording 
gives rise to the argument that the prior agreement is now void and the 
lien that was created was a general judgment lien, even though the 
parties previously agreed to a lien on the home.237 In addition, some 
courts hold divorce liens to be judicial liens simply because they were 
imposed by the filing of a judgment and decree in a court, ignoring the 
substantive nature of the consensual agreement between the parties.238 
Furthermore, other courts look to federal law to determine whether a 
divorce lien is a judicial lien, specifically the Code definitions of "lien" 
and "judicial lien. "239 
Since the Supreme Court has, however, "consistently recognized 
that '[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife 
... belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United 
States,' "240 a federal definition of "judicial lien" for bankruptcy pur­
poses should not override state definitions for family law purposes.241 
Conway, 93 B.R. 731 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1988); Hart v. Hart (In re Hart), 50 B.R. 956 
(Bankr. D. Nev. 1985); Wozniak v. Wozniak, 359 N.W.2d 147 (Wis. 1984). 
236. Several courts have held that divorce liens are equitable liens. However, these 
courts have differed on whether equitable liens are judicial liens. See Hartley v. Liberty 
Park Assocs., 774 P.2d 40 (Wash. App. 1989) (holding that an equitable lien is not a judi­
ciallien); Zachary v. Zachary, 99 B.R. 916 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (same); In re Warren, 91 B.R. 
930 (Bankr. D. Or. 1988) (same). But see In re Stone, 119 B.R. 222 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 
1990) (holding that an equitable lien is a judicial lien); In re Dudley, 68 B.R. 426 (Bankr. 
S.D. Fla. 1986) (same). 
237. See In re Pederson, 875 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1989); Maus v. Maus, 837 F.2d 935, 
939 (10th Cir. 1988). 
238. Wood v. Godfrey (In re Godfrey), 102 B.R. 769, 773 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1989); 
Duncan v. Sczepanski (In re Duncan), 85 B.R. 80, 82-83 (W.D. Wis. 1988). 
239. See In re Boggess, 105 B.R. 470, 474-75 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1989); In re Brothers, 
100 B.R. 565, 567-68 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1989). 11 U.S.C. § 101(33) (1988) defines "lien" 
as a "charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of 
an obligation." Id. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32) (1988) defines '~udiciallien" as a "lien obtained by 
judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding." Id. 
240. Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 625 (1987) (quoting In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 
593-94 (1890». The Court further stated that when state family law confticts with a federal 
statute, the Court's review under the Supremacy Clause is limited to a determination of 
whether Congress has clearly mandated that federal law preempt state law. Id. In order 
for a state law governing domestic relations to be overridden, it "must do 'major damage' 
to 'clear and substantial' federal interests." Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 
(1979) (quoting United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966». 
241. The federal definitions of lien and judicial lien should not create a question of 
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Moreover, to uphold a divorce lien when the lien is agreed to by the 
parties, but avoid the lien when it is created by the family court "ig­
nores the function and purpose of the marriage dissolution proceed­
ings and creates an artificial and unfair distinction between the two 
manners of distributing property."242 Such a distinction undermines 
the equity powers of the state courts in granting enforceable judg­
ments, especially since "the family courts are considerably limited in 
the methods available to them to perform their dictated functions. "243 
In summary, although Farrey has essentially resolved the ques­
tion in joint tenancy situations of whether a spouse who was granted 
the marital home in divorce can avoid a divorce lien that was held by 
the former spouse and was created during the distribution of marital 
property at divorce, the decision has left many issues unanswered in 
sole ownership situations. Since the "critical" inquiry is a "question of 
state law,"244 divorce liens can still be avoided by virtue of the choice 
of words used in the divorce decree, the interpretation of these words, 
and the application of pertinent state law by various courts. Although 
conscientious drafting may mitigate this inequitable result, due to the 
variance among state divorce laws the possibility still exists for ex­
spouses with divorce liens to be left vulnerable to the scheming ex­
spouse who tries to unilaterally modify the divorce decree in complete 
disregard of the state courts and the state statutes requiring an equita­
ble distribution of the marital property. This wi11lead to arbitrary and 
inconsistent results where in virtually identical situations some divorce 
liens will be avoided while others will not, thereby, creating more, not 
less, confusion and conflict. 
preemption. See Boyd v. Robinson (In re Boyd), 31 B.R. 591, 596 (D. Minn. 1983),off'd, 
741 	F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1984). The court stated: 
Federal courts have traditionally abstained when faced with family law questions 
.... Given this unique character of family law, for the bankruptcy court to 
impose such a formalistic approach in its decision while ignoring the purpose of 
the marriage dissolution proceedings and intent of the family court is to come 
dangerously close to imposing its own judgment in place of the family courts .... 
[This] is not a proper subject for review of or preemption by the federal bank­
ruptcy court ... [for which it] can remove jurisdiction over the disposition of 
marital assets from the state trial and Supreme Courts or grant to a federal court 
the power to supercede, ... or alter a marital distribution [created in the state 
courts]. 
Id. 
242. Id. 
243. Id. 
244. Farrey v. Sanderfoot, III S. Ct. 1825,1830 (1991). 
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IV. 	 PROPOSAL FOR REsOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT-AN 
AMENDMENT TO THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 
Bankruptcy law is guided by the Code, but divorce law has no 
such uniform code.245 As a result, divorcing spouses are subject to the 
laws of their states that control divorces and divorce liens. Although 
state courts have an incentive to see that their decisions are enforce­
able, confusion, conflict, and controversy exist among the federal 
courts handling this issue. The determination of whether to avoid a 
particular divorce lien is highly fact driven and extremely dependent 
upon individual state law in the area of domestic relations.246 The 
Supreme Court's decision in Farrey, while attempting to resolve this 
issue, does not go far enough. The most viable solution to this conflict 
is to amend section 522(f)(1) of the Code. 
A. Current 11 u.s. C § 522(/)(1) 
Currently, section 522(f)(1) provides: 
Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid 
the fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the 
extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor 
would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this section, if such 
lien is ­
(1) . di 'al li 247a JU Cl en .... 
B. Proposed Amendment to 11 u.s. C § 522(/)(1) 
Under the proposed amendment section 522(f)(1) would provide: 
Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid 
the fixing of a lien, except for a lien arising from a divorce decree 
given to a spouse on the marital home, on an interest of the debtor in 
property to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which 
the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this 
section, if such lien is ­
(1) a judicial lien .... 
C. Discussion of the Proposed Amendment 
The proposed amendment eliminates the opportunity for inequi­
245. See supra note 68. Although divorce law has no uniform code, there are under­
lying policies, like equitable distribution, which do have a somewhat uniform impact. See 
supra notes 63-71 and accompanying text. 
246. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text. 
247. 11 	 U.S.C. § 522(f)(I) (1988). 
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table treatment of an ex-spouse with a divorce lien that still exists 
under Farrey, while maintaining the spirit and purpose of the Code. 
The proposed amendment will minimally, if at all, hinder the "fresh 
start" of the debtor since the debtor will receive the same share of the 
marital property that he or she would have received after the divorce 
had no bankruptcy occurred. 
Furthermore, the debtor will still get a "fresh start," but it will be 
the fresh start promoted by the Cod~, that is, freedom from consumer 
and commercial creditor harassment,248 rather than a type of en­
hanced fresh start obtained at the expense of the debtor's former 
spouse. As the Supreme Court has stated "the Act limits the opportu­
nity for a completely unencumbered new beginning to the 'honest but 
unfortunate debtor.' "249 The debtor spouse who pursues avoidance of 
a divorce lien is generally not the "honest but unfortunate debtor," but 
the crafty spouse seeking to circumvent the divorce decree by attempt­
ing to avoid the divorce lien. Once the lien is avoided, the debtor 
spouse has essentially used (or more aptly, abused) the bankruptcy 
system to circumvent the divorce decree in order to evade the debtor's 
responsibilities to his or her former spouse. As a result, the debtor 
spouse is unjustly enriched by his or her acquisition of the former 
spouse's share of the marital property. 
Finally, the proposed amendment does not vitiate the homestead 
exemption. The homestead exemption, as well as other exemptions, is 
permitted against other creditors such as the consumer and commer­
cial creditors against whom the exemptions were primarily aimed. 
The amended section 522(f)(I) would not allow "[t]he homestead law 
... [to] be employed by either spouse to wrong the other."2so Fur­
thermore, the bankruptcy system would be more efficient because of 
decreased litigation through the reduction of conflict between bank­
ruptcy law and divorce law. 
The Code unquestionably promotes giving a debtor a fresh start, 
but that fresh start is presumed to be with his or her own property not 
"with someone else's property."2S1 This amendment will allow both 
spouses to get a new beginning or fresh start after the divorce. 
248. See supra notes 30-56 and accompanying text. 
249. Grogan v. Gamer, 111 S. Ct. 654, 659 (1991) (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 
292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934». 
250. Holtzhauser v. Ho1tzhauser (In re Holtzhauser), 117 B.R. 519, 521 (Bankr. D. 
Neb. 1990) (quoting Best v. Zutavem, 74 N.W. 64 (Neb. 1898». 
251. Farrey v. Sanderfoot (In re Sanderfoot), 899 F.2d 598, 608 (7th Cir. 1990) (Pos­
ner, J., dissenting), rev'd, III S. Ct. 1825 (1991). 
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CONCLUSION 

Section 522(f)(1) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 is an 
important and useful tool in aiding a debtor to achieve a fresh start 
after bankruptcy unencumbered by prior debts. However, as enacted, 
the provision creates much confusion, difficulty, and controversy for 
both the courts and the attorneys involved when the lien sought to be 
avoided arises from a divorce settlement. 
The proposed amendment would benefit the parties, the attor­
neys, and the courts. It would prevent the conniving debtor spouse 
from abusing the bankruptcy laws, give both spouses a new beginning, 
and provide clearer guidance to attorneys and the courts. In addition, 
it would minimize at least one area of conflict between divorce law and 
bankruptcy law, reduce litigation, and reinforce the goal of equitable 
distribution in the family law area without hindering the fresh start 
goal of bankruptcy law. Therefore, in light of the legislative history 
and purpose of section 522(f)(l), the policy concerns relevant to our 
current society, and the elimination of confusion in the courts and po­
tential inequitable results, Congress should amend section 522(f)(1) of 
the Code to except from avoidance under it liens on the marital home 
that are granted to a former spouse in a divorce proceeding to secure 
an equitable distribution of the marital property. 
Gail P. Ferris 
